An increasing share of world FDI is carried out by multinationals from developing countries. These investors may have objectives and constraints that di¤er from their developed country counterparts. In this paper we focus on di¤erences in attitudes to corruption, and how these may shape the competition for the right to extract resources in a developing country context. We show how di¤erences in the investors' level of technology and di¤erences in the host country government's trade-o¤ between bribes and taxes determine who wins the competition for the resource and the winning price. We …nd that the entry of a corrupt investor may induce the honest investor to o¤er bribes instead of taxes. Surprisingly, however, our analysis also demonstrates that under some conditions, the entry of a corrupt investor may in fact induce the honest investor to increase its tax payments.
Introduction
Foreign direct investment ‡ows (FDI) are in ‡ux. An increasing share of world outward FDI ‡ows originates from developing countries and is hosted by oil and gas rich developing countries. These developments are illustrated in Figure 1 , tracking the development in the share of world FDI ‡ows from 2000 to 2010, using data from UNCTAD.
Multinationals from developing countries bring not only di¤erent technologies but potentially also di¤erent attitudes to corruption. Table 1 reports inclination to bribe abroad, measured by the Bribe Payers'Index (BPI) and the corresponding domestic corruption, measured as the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), for the top …ve and bottom …ve BPI countries, with data from Transparency International (TI). For both measures, a lower number means more corrupt. The table shows that multinationals from countries where corruption is pervasive, typically developing and transition economies, are more likely to bribe abroad. A reasonable interpretation of the positive correlation between BPI and CPI that we observe in Table 1 is that …rms located in countries where corruption is (perceived to be) pervasive face lower risks, both legal and market based, of bribing abroad. Developed countries have implemented legislation that forbids foreign bribery.
1 In addition, the market response to corruption, in the form of damaged reputation, drop in share prices, the risk of class action or debarment from procurement, is likely to vary according to the multinationals'home countries. This interpretation is consistent with a recent study of 166 corruption cases by Cheung et al. (2012) , which concludes that …rms from countries where managers and/or …rms are likely to face negative reactions to involvement in corruption are less likely to o¤er bribes abroad.
Hence, the increased share of world FDI originating from developing and transition countries suggests increased prevalence of corrupt practices in international investments. This increase in the "supply" of corruption is matched by an increase in the "demand" for corruption, as an increasing share of world FDI is hosted by resource rich developing countries, where corruption is typically prevalent.
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The present paper analyses how the growing importance of developing country multinationals may a¤ect the competition for natural resources in a developing country context. The envision a situation with two …rms, a developed country multinational and a developing country multinational, bidding for an asset sold by a government which places weight on both bribes and tax income. The developed county multinational is technologically more advanced than its developing country counterpart, and faces a moral or pecuniary cost of being involved in a corrupt transaction. For short, we shall sometimes refer to the developed country …rm as "honest". Regarding the developing country multinational, we analyse both the case where it, like the developed …rm, faces a cost of corruption, and when it faces no such cost, in which case we may refer to it as "corrupt".
One …nding from our analysis is that competition with a corrupt investor may induce the honest investor to also start paying bribes. More surprisingly, however, we also demonstrate that competition with the corrupt …rm under certain circumstances may lead the honest investor to pay a higher tax to the host country to acquire the resource. Intuitively, in corrupt host countries, the corrupt investor may be a tougher competitor to the honest investor, forcing the latter to raise its tax bid for the resource to compensate for the 'disadvantage'of not o¤ering a bribe. As long as this is the winning bid, it is good for the host country, which receives higher tax revenues from a hightech investor. But clearly, if the contract is signed with the corrupt …rm, the host country loses, since the investor is low-tech and on top of that pays lower taxes. We explore which investor wins the contract as well as the terms of this contract, highlighting the importance of host government emphasis on bribes, the technology gap between investors, and the competing …rm's bribe-aversion as critical factors.
Anecdotal evidence on corruption in natural resources abounds. Consider for example the tender for a 30-year lease for operating the Aynak mine in Afghanistan, one of the world's biggest depositories of copper. A Chinese …rm, MCC, won the contract in competition with 14 international mining companies, including bids from the United States and Canada. According to facts about the process and the other bids made public by the Afghan government, the Chinese clearly outbid the other …rms, partly with a high signature bonus and partly with promises of investments in infrastructure and a new power plant. However, according to leakages from US intelligence reports, the Chinese paid a $30 million bribe to the Afghan Minister of Mines. The Minister had to leave his post shortly after the event, allegedly because of this corruption. The Chinese now operate the Aynak mine, but have failed to meet their commitments regarding production, infrastructure developments and the promised power plant. Tax revenues from the copper production are far lower than forecasted when the tender took place in 2007. This story shows how a new investor, in this case from China, uses bribes to outperform investors from more developed countries, thereby enriching centrally placed politicians but with a sub-optimal result for the country as a whole.
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Our paper is most closely related to Burguet and Perry (2007) , who analyse a situation where an auctioneer allows a supplier to revise its bid upon information about other bids and in exchange for a bribe. This, they …nd, has highly distortive consequences in cases when this supplier is weaker in terms of what quality it can o¤er. When the briber is also the ex ante strongest …rm with regard to technology, the distortion is primarily on the price o¤ered to the buyer, which they …nd can be lower in the case of corruption compared to the case of no corruption. Also Burguet and Che (2004) , analyzing the impact of corruption on contract allocation, …nd that e¢ cient …rms pay an overly high burden in competition with less honest …rms. They …nd corruption to distort the allocative outcome of procurement, meaning that a bribe may compensate for signi…cant technological inferiority, i.e. corruption makes it possible for less e¢ cient …rms to win contracts. Other related literature includes Søreide (2009) , which analyses how attitudes to risk may a¤ect corrupt behavior, and Engel et al. (2012) who consider asymmetric punishment and corruption.
Our contribution adds to this literature by focusing on how the host country decision-maker's trade-o¤ between personal and social bene…ts in ‡uences contract allocation and prices. The e¤ect of bribe-biased preferences on the auction outcome is far from trivial. For instance, we demonstrate that equilibrium bribes may be lower in a setting where the politician focuses narrowly on bribes compared to a situation where the politician places a larger weight on social outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model with the case of (a) symmetric and (b) asymmetric propensity to o¤er bribes, Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium outcome, while Section 4 concludes.
Model
A developing country is auctioning out a license to explore a natural resource, such as an oil …eld. The government of this country values bribes (B) and taxes (t) that are derived from the auction, according to the following utility function:
where ! is the weight placed on bribes relative to tax income. Taxes should be interpreted broadly to include any bene…ts that accrue to society from the sale of the resource. We envision a setting where the decision maker can freely determine the allocation of the resource and the terms of the contract, without risking any repercussions. The decision maker may, however, place a positive weight on the welfare of the population, for instance to boost his popularity and reduce the risk of rebellion. In other words, even a highly corrupt dictator is likely to have a ! lower than one.
Two …rms are interested in making a bid for the license. Firm i's objective function is given by:
where the …rst term is the gross revenues from the resource ( i ), as determined by the investor's technology, the second term is acquisition costs, consisting of bribes (B i ) and taxes (t i ), and the third term is the burden f i , moral or pecuniary (in expected terms), of paying a bribe.
Competition for the resource is structured as a second price auction, with the winner being the player with the higher bid, and with the acquisition price given by the bid of the losing party. Note that the price may consist of both a bribe and a tax, and is de…ned in terms of government utility, see Bjorvatn and Søreide (2005) .
We focus on two potential asymmetries between the …rms; technology and aversion to corruption. For concreteness, let …rm a be the technologically more advanced …rm, and let a = 1; b = < 1. We can think of …rm a as a developed country multinational and …rm b as a developing country multinational. As discussed above, the developed country multinational is likely to face stronger pressure not to be involved in corruption. We model this as f a > 0, and sometimes refer to this as the honest …rm. Note, however, that even the honest …rm in our setting may be involved in corruption, if the gains of a corrupt deal outweigh the (expected ) costs. We discuss both the case where the developing country multinational is honest, that is, f b = f a > 0, and when it is corrupt, that is, when f b = 0.
Competition between two honest …rms
We start out by analyzing the case where the two …rms are equally bribe sensitive, f a = f b = f . In this case, it is clear that the more e¢ cient …rm a necessarily wins the auction, so the question is; how does it win the auction?
To answer this question, we …rst consider what …rm b's maximum bid is. Clearly, if …rm b makes a tax bid, the maximum government utility that it can generate is U = f . Hence, we know that …rm b when o¤ering its maximal bid is indi¤erent between paying bribes and taxes when:
For > 1 , it makes a bribe bid, while for 1 , it makes a tax bid. Note that 1 is a decreasing function of !; the more weight the host government places on bribes, the more likely it is that …rm b o¤ers a bribe. Also note that a higher pulls in the direction of o¤ering a bribe; the bribe aversion becomes relatively less important when the economic stakes involved in the auction increase, re ‡ected by a higher .
In the second price auction, …rm a wins the contract by matching the government utility of …rm b's maximal bid. As we have seen above, the maximal bid of …rm b is the tax bid t ), which can be expressed as (1 !) t a = (1 !) , which solving for t a gives the equilibrium tax bid:
Alternatively, it could win by o¤ering a bribe bid determined by
), which can be expressed as !B a = (1 !) , which gives the equilibrium bribe bid:
Plugging these values, t a and B a , into …rm a's pro…t function, we …nd that it is indi¤erent between the two when = 1 , and strictly prefers to make the tax bid t a when < 1 . This implies that whenever …rm b chooses to make a bribe bid, so does …rm a. Turning to the case of > 1 we can derive …rm a's winning bid from the condition U a (B a ) = U ), which equals !B a = ! ( f ), which solving for B a can be expressed as:
Hence, in the symmetric bribe aversion case we can conclude that:
Observation 1. For 1 , …rm a wins the contract by o¤ering a tax t a (t max b ) = while for > 1 …rm a wins the contract by o¤ering a bribe
Evidently, even an honest, technologically superior …rm may not necessarily win the contract by taxes alone. If the decision maker in the host country is su¢ ciently corrupt, the investor may be tempted to win the deal by o¤ering a bribe instead of the tax, with the price discount associated with the corrupt transaction more than outweighing the investor's moral or expected pecuniary costs.
Competition between an honest and a corrupt …rm
We now introduce asymmetric bribe aversion. In order for there to be an interesting trade-o¤ between the two …rms in the auction, we assume that the advanced …rm a has a higher aversion against paying bribes than its less advanced rival, for instance due to stricter anti-corruption legislation in the home country of the advanced …rm. Let f b = 0, while f a = f > 0.
In this case, it is not obvious which …rm wins the contract; …rm a clearly has the higher ability to bribe, but …rm b has the higher willingness to bribe. Note, however, that this trade-o¤ only applies for ! > , the auction is trivial; …rm a wins by o¤ering a tax that is equal to the maximal bid by …rm b, that is, t a = . In the following, therefore, we limit ourselves to the situation of ! > 1 2 .
The winner
We start by considering the maximal bid by …rm b. Clearly, since …rm b has no aversion to paying bribes, and since bribes, given our assumption of ! > ), which can be expressed as:
The bribe bid by …rm a matches the bid by …rm b when U ), which can be expressed as:
Hence, when > max ( 2 ; 3 ) …rm b wins the bid, while for max ( 2 ; 3 ), …rm a wins the bid. Not surprisingly, the larger is the weight on bribe income in the host government's objective function, and the larger are the honest …rm's costs of paying bribes, the more likely it is that the corrupt …rm wins the contract for any level of technology.
The price
Now that we have established the conditions for who wins the auction, we turn to the equilibrium price. Given that …rm a wins, does it pay a tax or a bribe? Note that a winning bribe bid by …rm a would be such that
), which can be stated as !B a = ! , or simply:
Alternatively, the winning tax bid by …rm a would be such that
), which can be stated as (1 !) t a = ! , implying that:
Plugging these into …rm a's pro…t function, we …nd that a is indi¤erent between the two, i.e., a (B a ) = a (t a ), when:
Hence, we can conclude that:
Observation 2. Given that …rm a wins the contract, for 4 it does so by o¤ering a tax t a (B What about when …rm b wins the contract, that is, for > max ( 2 ; 3 )? We know that …rm a is indi¤erent between o¤ering a bribe and a tax as its maximal bid when U max a (B max a ) = U max a (t max a ), which can be expressed as.
where we have used the fact that B max a = 1 f and t max a = 1. That is, for ! ! 1 the maximal o¤er by …rm a is de…ned by a tax bid, while for ! > ! 1 the maximal o¤er by …rm a is de…ned by a bribe bid. Hence, for ! ! 1 , …rm b wins by o¤ering a bribe such
Note that the equilibrium bribe is falling in !, since a higher ! reduces the value of …rm a's tax bid. For ! > ! 1 , …rm b wins by o¤ering a bribe such that
), which can be expressed as:
In this case, therefore, the bribe is constant, independent of !. 
Analysis
The equilibrium outcome of the competition for resources in this corrupt environment is illustrated in Figure 2 . The …gure shows the critical levels of de…ned in equations (3), (7), (8) and (11), and ! 1 from equation (12), for a given level of f . The di¤erent constellations of equilibrium buyer and price are marked with di¤erent capital letters (A-D) in the …gure, with the properties of each area detailed in Table 2 . 
In area A, …rm a wins the auction. Interestingly, taxes are now increasing in !, the government's emphasis on bribes. In fact, taxes are higher when competing against a corrupt …rm (t a = ! 1 ! ) than when competing against another honest …rm (t a = ). The reason is that competition for assets sold by a corrupt government places the corrupt …rm at an advantage. To compensate for the rival's advantage, the honest …rm may have to pay a higher tax.
In area B, too, …rm a wins the auction. But, while it wins by o¤ering a tax (t a = ) when competing against another honest …rm, it wins by o¤ering a bribe (B a = ) when competing against a corrupt …rm. Note, therefore, that areas A and B are radically di¤erent when it comes to how the type of competition a¤ects the equilibrium outcome: In area A, competing against a corrupt …rm leads to increased taxes. In area B; however, it leads to the complete erosion of taxes.
In area C …rm a wins the competition against an honest rival but not against a corrupt competitor. Again, competition with a corrupt …rm completely erodes taxation, and in this case also leads to an ine¢ cient outcome, in the sense that the low-tech …rm wins the auction.
In area D, …rm a wins the auction when competing against an honest rival (this time by o¤ering a bribe), while it loses when competing against a corrupt rival. In the former case, …rm a wins by o¤ering a bribe B a = f , while in the latter case, the corrupt rival wins by o¤ering B b = 1 f . Clearly, the level of bribes is higher in the latter case.
In area E …rm a wins over an honest rival, and does so by paying a tax (t a = ). In contrast, a corrupt rival wins over a and does so by paying a bribe (B b =
! !
). Note that the bribe is falling in !; in e¤ect, a more bribe-focused host government increases the comparative advantage of the corrupt …rm, allowing it to o¤er a lower bribe and still win the contract.
Conclusion
The rise of transition and developing country multinationals presents new challenges to multinationals headquartered in the developed world and new possibilities for (more or less) corrupt governments in resource rich countries. Developing country investors are likely to be disadvantaged in terms of technology, but may be more willing and able to o¤er bribes to access resources abroad. Our analysis shows how this asymmetric competition plays out in an auction for a resource in a corrupt host country. We analyze who wins the auction and whether the payment is in the form of taxes or bribes, focusing on how the technology gap between investors and the degree of government corruption a¤ect the outcome.
Not surprisingly, the entry of a corrupt investor may make a corrupt deal more likely, especially if the technological gap is not too wide and if the host government places a large weight on bribes relative to taxes. By reducing tax income and lowering the quality of investments, corruption may thus erode the positive welfare e¤ects that could have been derived from the natural resource. More surprisingly, however, our analysis shows that competition with a corrupt investor does not necessarily lead to higher bribes and lower taxes compared the situation with two honest investors. In fact, given that the government is not too corrupt, the developed country investor wins the contract by o¤ering higher taxes than it would have done competing against another honest investor.
In a larger perspective, our paper can be seen as shedding light on the mechanisms underlying the so-called resource curse, that is, the negative link between natural resource and economic development, which is particularly evident for countries with weak institutions. We have shown why corruption may lead to a loss of tax revenues and the use of less e¢ cient technology for a country auctioning out a license to explore its resources. Clearly, these distortions may have macroeconomic implications. Moreover, as shown by Asiedu and Lien (2011), Robinson et al. (2006) and others, corruption in resource related FDI may have a negative impact also on the institutional development of a country, with damaging impacts on its long-term growth potential.
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